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Perhaps the most pressing issue today for pension fund managers and, thus, investors 
saving for retirement, is the availability of assets that will provide shares in the real wealth 
of the nation to fund stable payments to pensioners, preferably assets with none of the 
counterparty risk that has loomed so large in the recent financial crisis. Traditionally, a 
large part of any pension plan’s holdings has been in fixed-income assets such as long-
duration government bonds. Pension funds typically hold about 25 percent to 30 percent of 
their net assets in fixed-income and inflation-protected bonds, highlighting the importance 
of very low risk securities. The United States government currently issues a range of such 
debt instruments, including short-term and long-term debt with either nominal or real 
coupon payments. The largest portion of this debt is short-term, nominal-fixed coupon, 
which serves a primary objective of the federal government’s debt strategy: providing a 
source of low-cost funding for its operations. But these debt instruments do not allow 
pension fund managers to attain an optimal risk exposure for pensioners. 
In this study, we make the case for the U.S. government to issue a new security; 
one that we believe would offer great direct benefit to U.S. citizens, the operations of the 
U.S. government, and the rest of the world as well. This new security would have its 
coupon tied to United States’ gross domestic product (GDP) in current dollars. This 
security would be long term in maturity, ideally even perpetual. Such a security would be 
attractive to private and public pension funds around the world, as it would provide access 
to a broader range of income-earning potential in the U.S. We believe this new debt 
instrument would also be of interest to the Government for its stabilizing influence on the 
budget (as coupon payments would fall in a recession with declining tax revenues), 
mitigating the rollover risk attendant with short term debt in a way that currently available 
long term government debt cannot. 
A small-denomination GDP share might pay, for example, a coupon each year of 
one-trillionth of that year’s GDP, or about $14.40 at current levels. On this basis, we 
propose the name “Trill” be used to refer to this new security. Similar to shares issued by 
corporations paying a fraction of corporate earnings in dividends, the Trill would pay a 
fraction of the “earnings” of the U.S.  Given the characteristics of GDP growth, our 
valuation of the Trill indicates its yield would be very attractive to the issuer, the U.S. 
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government, and, for the same reasons, would be a useful new source of income to 
investors who want exposure to income growth and protection against inflation. 
Why Investors Need Trills  
Because nominal GDP would be used to determine the Trill’s coupon value, the inflation-
protection properties of the Trill would resemble that of the US Treasury’s Inflation-
Protected Securities (TIPS). Inflation protection alone would be sufficient to generate 
interest in Trills comparable to that which exists for TIPS. Further interest would be 
generated by an additional desirable characteristic; namely that their coupons and 
principal would respond to variations in GDP. Trills would protect relative standards of 
living in retirement, since they are a constant share of GDP, in contrast to TIPS, which 
purchase a declining real share of a growing GDP over time.  
Creation of Trills can be motivated in terms of models of intergenerational risk 
sharing.  There is a small literature that considers the benefits of intergenerational risk-
smoothing through long-lived assets. Some of this work does not involve government 
debt (see, for instance Peled 1984, Allen and Gale 1997, and Geanakoplos 2008) though 
much of this literature does investigate the impact of government debt on welfare. Gale 
(1990) shows that uncertainty in an OLG model leads to incompleteness and allows for 
government debt issuance to be pareto-improving through its impact on intergenerational 
transfers. In particular, long-term debt may provide much better insurance than short-
term debt. Improvements in welfare may not be surprising with incomplete markets. In 
this case the government can provide innovative financial securities and complete 
markets. Even if markets are complete, however, in an overlapping generations (OLG) 
model the competitive equilibrium may be inefficient so that government debt or 
transfers can still improve welfare (see, for instance, Gale 1990 and Demange 2002). 
Bohn (1990) makes a strong argument for government liabilities that provides a hedge 
(for the government) against macroeconomic shocks to smooth tax revenues and 
maximize welfare. He finds that shorting the stock market is one way this could be 
accomplished. Of course, issuance of Trills is a natural way for the government to do this, 
and we return to this issue below. Bohn (1999, 2001, 2003) builds on the Diamond 
(1965) model to show that in an OLG neoclassical framework, government use of debt is 
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potentially welfare improving, because of inefficiencies in the allocation of risk across 
generations, in particular the problem that future (unborn) generations are naturally 
excluded from financial markets. Kruger and Kubler (2006) apply the overlapping 
generations model of Paul Samuelson (1957) to show that government interventions 
analogous to Trills can be Pareto improving. Trills can also be motivated in terms of 
models of international risk sharing, Athanasoulis and Shiller (2001).   
Of particular note in light of recent market turmoil, Trills would have virtually no 
counterparty risk, in contrast to currently available assets that protect relative standards of 
living in retirement. 
The recent trend to pension funds investments in “real assets” (Jacobius 2009) is 
sign of a thirst for long-duration assets that reflect the real economy in ways that are 
different from conventional financial assets. Matching cash inflows and outflows is at the 
heart of any pension fund investment strategy since pension obligations stretch out over 
decades. Many plans offer benefits that are linked to wages as they accrue and to inflation 
once they are in pay. Investing in real assets and inflation-protected bonds are two ways 
these plans seek to generate steady, inflation-protected income flows. 
There is a wide range of assets currently available to large pension plans. These 
include: municipal, state, and federal government bonds; international government and 
real-return (inflation-protected) bonds and debt; domestic and foreign publicly traded 
equities; derivatives (such as equity swaps and futures, exchange-traded futures contracts 
and foreign-exchange forwards); commercial paper, bank notes, mortgages, private equity, 
real estate and infrastructure assets. A reasonable person might wonder, what more does 
the market need?  
Although the availability of publicly traded debt, equity and derivative securities, 
as well as private equity assets, makes for a fairly comprehensive menu with which to 
diversify a portfolio, these securities represent a small fraction of the wealth of the nation. 
Wages, salaries and supplementary labor income make up roughly two-thirds of the U.S.’s 
GDP, but trading on claims to these income flows is essentially closed off to markets and 
investors. While it is true that government debt is a claim on future labor income, the 
majority of this debt is short term and produces income flows that are fixed nominal 
coupons. Claimants to this debt may benefit from avoiding the repercussions of a 
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slowdown in the economy, but they do not enjoy the gains from a growing economy as 
would claimants to a security such as a Trill, which would grow with GDP.  
Corporate profits after tax represent approximately 10 percent of the GDP. Without 
access to direct claims on future labor income, which makes up the bulk of the remaining 
income flows and hence the bulk of the wealth of the nation, pensioners who invest only in 
stocks are restricted to the return from holding claims on corporate profits. They are thus 
very far from holding a diversified portfolio.  
It is possible that the stock market will not perform as well in the 21st century as it 
did in the twentieth century. For example, during the 20th century baby boom, the 
capital/labor split of corporate income may have favoured the relatively scarce resource of 
capital. But in the 21st century, labor may become relatively scarce, and returns to capital 
may decline. If afforded the opportunity to invest in Trills, investors could insulate 
themselves from the risk of declining returns to capital and ever more expensive labor 
costs.  
The target-income funds, or life-cycle funds, that are newly popular are designed 
for people in a specified age cohort. For example, the AllianceBernstein 2035 Retirement 
Portfolio invests for those planning to retire in 2035, while the Fidelity ClearPath 2045 Sr 
A plan invests for people who want to leave the work force in 2045. These funds have high 
equity exposure when their participants are young and reduce the exposure as they age. In 
the future, they could fulfill their basic mission better by taking a dynamic portfolio 
strategy involving Trills. Ideally, they would hold a relatively small proportion of their 
portfolio in Trills (or even short Trills) when their participants are still young, so as to 
reduce their exposure to the risks of the economy and their labor income. As participants 
approach retirement, when their welfare increasingly depends on investments rather than 
labor income, the funds would invest progressively more heavily in Trills.  
Holders of 401K Plans could also benefit from options that are tailored to their 
individual circumstances. The 401K could, for example, offer investments in target-income 
funds that optimize Trill holdings. 
As we outline below, we can, subject to some assumptions, estimate the return in 
the future to holding a Trill. Standard mean-variance (return versus risk) optimization over 
asset classes, including the estimated return to holding Trills, suggests that Trills might 
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allow investors a return very nearly as high as the S&P 500, with half the volatility. 
Indeed, investors gain a much higher return and lower volatility than if Trills are excluded 
from the mix. This mean-variance optimization produces an optimal portfolio composition 
of 28 percent of assets in long-term bonds, 38 percent in the S&P 500 index and 34 percent 
in Trills. Thus, the addition of Trills to the asset mix available today would likely have a 
dramatic impact on investor portfolio composition and investor well-being.  
Why Treasury Should Introduce Trills 
The benefits and the costs to Americans more generally are of primary concern 
when considering the introduction of the Trill. While a positive argument can be made for 
investors holding this new security, an important question is whether issuing Trills make 
sense for the issuer, the U.S. government. Is the investor’s gain the taxpayer’s loss?  
To understand if a case can be made for issuing these new securities, it helps to 
consider the current objectives of the government with respect to issuing debt obligations, 
and look forward to the challenges of managing the nation's wealth. The U.S. government 
issues very few classes of securities, but ensures that the issued securities are both easily 
marketed at favourable yields and traded in liquid, well-functioning markets.  
In the abstract, the Treasury might be considered to have a variety of missions, not 
so simply defined as just the funding of government activities. Ideally, Treasury must also 
worry about managing the risks of specific government activities, of dealing with 
intergenerational risk sharing, with reducing systemic risks,  with helping the central bank 
in lender of last resort functions, with providing risk management opportunies for 
individuals, with encouraging international spreading of risks, with managing 
precommitment and default risks and political risks, with managing the balance of 
payments and exchange rate, with managing the reputation of the national debt among 
international investors, with considering the effects of the real national debt on the nation’s 
ability to raise funds in future emergencies such as depressions, wars and natural 
catastrophes. There is today no canonical theory of all the missions of the Treasury. We 
imagine that the issuance of Trills might play a role in fulfilling many of these missions of 
the Treasury, but we cannot consider all of these issues here.   
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The stated mission of the US Treasury, found in the Strategic Plan of the Treasury 
FY 2007-2012, is: 
Serve the American people and strengthen national security by managing the U.S. 
Government's finances effectively, promoting economic growth and stability, and ensuring 
the safety, soundness, and security of the U.S. and international financial systems. 
Another explicit statement of the U.S. government’s debt policy also found in the 
Strategic Plan of the Treasury FY 2007-2012: 
The Department of the Treasury provides the American public with cost-effective, 
 efficient and secure management of federal finances …The Treasury Department will 
develop a cash balance financing portfolio model to minimize interest costs and other risk 
factors, such as operational and rollover risk. 
  
Taking these statements as given, we can proceed a little more definitely to consider the 
role of Trills. The main objective of the federal debt strategy is to raise stable and low-cost 
funding to meet the operational needs of the Government. An associated objective is to 
maintain a well-functioning U.S. government  securities market, which helps to keep debt 
costs low and contributes to efficient capital markets by providing important pricing and 
hedging tools.  
Stability and low-cost are actually competing goals, as the short-term securities 
issued by the government are typically cheapest to issue, but also exhibit the most 
volatility in yield over time and rollover risk. We will discuss the second priority - 
maintaining efficient financial markets -- after careful consideration of the cost and 
stability of funds associated with issuing Trills. 
The Cost of Borrowing  
To preview our results, the cost of Trills would likely be little more than 1.5 
percentage points above that of short-term government debt (the return to Trills would be 
from the coupon and the capital gains). The competing goal of stable funding for the 
government clearly favours the introduction of the Trill. A fiscal planner, concerned with 
the cost of servicing debt in a recession, would view the Trill as a natural hedge against 
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budget shortfalls – the coupon paid on the Trill will track government revenues as both rise 
and fall with the GDP. 
What features enable low-cost funding? Basically, any security that moves risk 
away from the investor and onto the issuer will be more highly valued by investors and 
therefore entail a lower cost for the issuer. Still, it seems likely that the cost of issuing 
Trills would be higher than that of issuing fixed-coupon, inflation-protected debt.  
The Treasury Inflation Protected Securities (TIPS) already issued by the U.S. 
government have a number of features that are attractive to investors. There is virtually no 
default risk with TIPS (likely no more than a Trill would pose), there is little or no 
inflation risk (which is similar to the inflation protection afforded by the Trill) and, unlike 
the coupon from a Trill, the TIPS income is fixed in real terms. In good times and bad, an 
investor will get a known, risk-free real coupon.  
The coupon from the Trill, on the other hand, will vary with the GDP of the 
economy. This is good for the issuer, the U.S. government, because when the economy is 
expanding rapidly and the Trill pays more to the investor, the government has better tax 
revenues and hence better ability to pay. When times are bad, the Trill pays (relatively) 
less, which is also good for the government because this is exactly when tax revenues fall.  
For some investors, in good times there is less need for a big coupon from the Trill 
– all of a domestic investor’s income sources are likely paying off in good times. In bad 
times for the U.S., when the domestic investor may really need the money, the Trill is 
paying less. In the language of financial economists, the Trill exposes domestic investors 
to systematic risk and insures the government against it. If the Trills are held only by 
domestic investors, these investors will need to be compensated for bearing this risk. To 
the extent that the Trills become held by foreign investors, whose GDPs are not highly 
correlated with U.S. GDP, the compensation will likely be lower. For still other investors, 
including pension funds, this disadvantage comes with an important offsetting advantage: 
that Trills will provide higher incomes when their wage-indexed liabilities are growing 
more quickly in booms, and when Trills pay lower incomes, in slumps, pension fund wage-
indexed liabilities are also growing more slowly. 
These cross-cutting considerations make it difficult to estimate whether Trills or 
regular fixed-coupon nominal debt will be cheaper for the U.S. government to issue. Trills 
 10
provide inflation protection while fixed-coupon, nominal debt provides fixed (albeit 
nominal) income flows. A more formal way of estimating the cost of capital associated 
with issuing Trills is through an examination of the U.S. GDP’s historic record. By treating 
GDP as a dividend and using tools for pricing income-producing assets, we can estimate 
the price and return of a Trill. 
Athanasoulis and Shiller (2001) considered the pricing of portfolios of claims on 
GDP from a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model that considered Trills as taking 
their full dimensions, as if every person on earth took optimal positions in Trills in all 
countries and one riskless asset, subject only to specified limits on the number of markets. 
(See also Shiller and Athanasoulis 2000 and Athanasoulis, van Wincoop and Shiller 2002). 
To achieve this general equilibrium theory, they made some strong assumptions about 
utility functions and the absence of other assets, and produced what they called the 
constant absolute risk premium (CARP) model that enabled them to estimate risk premia to 
various portfolios of claims on GDP. The only data input to their econometric model was 
time series observations on the real GDPs of the countries of the world and their 
populations. With this model, no country’s securities can be priced without considering the 
relation if its GDP with each other country’s GDP, since the risk sharing opportunities 
cannot be evaluated if any country is missing from the analysis. Since the model was 
internally rigorous, it allowed estimation of the welfare gains of introducing these new 
assets.  
We take here a shorter-term, and more immediately practical, focus.  We do not 
wish to assume that the Trills are launched full blown to all individuals in the world, nor 
do we wish to disregard the presence of other assets, nor to disregard political barriers to 
establishing such risk management at such a global level. Thus, in this paper we sought to 
take a more practical, partial equilibrium, approach to pricing trills, from the work of 
Donaldson and Kamstra (1996) and Donaldson, Kamstra and Kramer (2009).  
The valuation of any income-producing asset first requires an estimate of the risk 
premium2 demanded by investors. Standard techniques to evaluate an asset’s risk exposure 
rely on the availability of returns to that asset.  To begin, one must estimate what a Trill 
                                                 
2 The risk premium is an ex ante premium or extra return (or price concession) investors demand when they 
decide to invest in risky assets like equities instead of risk-free debt. 
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might be worth, and then estimate how returns to a Trill would vary over time and co-vary 
with other risky assets. We apply a risk premium equal to that used to discount risky 
equities as a proxy for the premium investors would expect when holding a Trill. This 
estimate is likely too high (a claim to the GDP of the U.S. is a more diversified asset than a 
claim to cash flows from publicly traded equities) but it provides a sensible starting point 
to place an upper bound on the required rate of return and a lower bound on the price of a 
Trill. We employ an extension of the Gordon Model (1962) developed by Donaldson and 
Kamstra (1996) to perform our valuation exercise. Our sample ends in 2007, and therefore 
excludes the remarkable behavior of the stock market after the subprime crisis, a potential 
problem we will return to in the appendix. The Donaldson and Kamstra (DK) technique 
permits extremely complex scenario analysis that is otherwise infeasible, considering 
scenarios in which the income-flow growth rates and/or the risk premium never settle 
down and possibly influence each other as well.  Details on this procedure and related 
issues can be found in the Appendix. 
Figure 1 displays DK prices and associated yields for the S&P 500 index (prices in 
Panel A, yields in Panel B) and what they would have been for Trills (Panels C and D) 
from the late 1950s to 2007, with prices normalized so that each investment is worth one 
dollar in 1966. Panels A and B also plot realized market prices and yields for the S&P 500 
index which we will use to evaluate the success of the DK procedure. If the DK procedure 
is helpful, then the prices and yields it produces should capture the main features of the 
market price and yield—rapid appreciation over the past 40 years with remarkably low 
dividend yields. 
Although the estimated S&P 500 prices (the line indicated with squares in Panel A) 
fall well below market prices (the line indicated with solid dots in Panel A) for the late 
1990s, the estimated and actual prices generally move together. Indeed, the actual and 
fitted yields are highly correlated with a coefficient of more than 0.85. Altogether, 
application of the Donaldson-Kamstra approach to pricing the equity market lends some 
confidence to the notion that the DK estimated prices for the Trill will be a good first 
approximation to market prices, and that the estimated yields should not be wildly off the 
mark.  
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Panels C and D of Figure 1 display estimated prices and yields respectively for 
Trills from the late 1950s to 2007, again with prices normalized to equal one in 1966. As 
we saw for the S&P 500 index, prices increased dramatically in the 1990s. The similarity 
to the S&P 500 index is not coincidental and comes from the favorable interest-rate 
environment, which affects identically the value of S&P 500 index and the Trill.  
The more dramatic increase in the plotted (estimated) price of the Trill relative to 
the S&P 500 index comes from the relatively rapid increase in the cash flow that would 
have been realized (had such an investment been available) from owning a Trill, combined 
with the low fade rate3 of this cash flow growth.4 In general, good news (or bad) is 
expected to persist for the U.S. economy longer than for public equity. Hence, the strong 
economic growth of the 1990s would have led to very sharp increases in the value of a 
Trill, even sharper than that of the S&P 500 index. 
                                                 
3 Fade rate refers to the speed of a reversal to a baseline level. 
4 An increase in the growth rate of the Trill’s cash flow is expected to persist much longer than that of the 





Given these results, it is likely that had Trills been available we would have seen 
very aggressive appreciation in their price over the past half century, perhaps even greater 
than we have seen for the S&P 500 index. The coupon yield on Trills (that is, the cash 
flow-to-price ratio) would have been lower than the dividend yield on the S&P 500 index, 
though the two would have been similar in magnitude. If anything, the estimated prices 
and yields for the Trill are conservative, underpricing the asset and overestimating the 
required yield, because this method takes no account of the particular benefits these 
securities will offer to investors, pension funds in particular, that currently have no access 
to this type of asset. 
 
Another way to calculate the cost of capital relevant to issuing Trills is by 
estimating a Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) beta for the Trill; calculating the degree 
of correlation between the return on the Trill and the market return (typically proxied by 
the overall stock index). While the return to a Trill itself should be the appropriate measure 
of the total market return, since the Trill represents a claim on the GDP of the entire 
economy, we use a classic CAPM estimation for the purposes of evaluating the risk and 
appropriate reward for holding a Trill. Our analysis measures the amount of the S&P 500 
index return that is in excess of the Treasury bill return as the market excess return. This 
CAPM regression produces a beta of approximately 0.25, showing that the Trill is clearly a 
low-risk asset. The CAPM estimate of the required rate of return for the Trill is 7.5 
percent, indicating a risk premium of only 1.5 percent. This is consistent with our 
suspicion that the equity risk premium we applied to generate the Trill’s returns is likely 
too large. 
So even before taking into account the additional willingness to pay of investors 
who would find Trills uniquely attractive, we conclude that the cost of Trills would likely 
be low, and possibly less than some outstanding government securities. The competing 
goal of stable funding for the government, moreover, potentially counterbalances any 
higher cost of borrowing. Georges (2003) shows that considerations of the overall budget 
balance through the business cycle can impact optimal debt management. Traditional 
analysis of debt management emphasizes debt maturity structure as a choice between low 
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cost but volatile short-term debt and higher cost but more stable long-term debt. Georges 
(2003) points out that a fiscal planner would typically be most concerned with the risk that 
the cost of servicing debt jumps up at a time when the government budget can least afford 
it, say in a recession. This echoes a motivation for the offering of real return bonds, the 
value of diversifying government debt obligations to reduce the risk of a budget crisis, 
even if this diversification increases the average cost of borrowing to the government.5 
Liability management issues lead directly to the Trill as a natural hedge against budget 
shortfalls – the coupon paid on the Trill will track government revenues as both rise and 
fall with the GDP. 
Variants on the Trill could include bonds with coupons based on national income or 
consumption, or even tax revenues. Like GDP, these economic statistics are commonly 
revised over time. For example, a given year’s final GDP figure may not be known with 
certainty for some time. Nevertheless, dividends are routinely paid to shareholders based 
on preliminary corporate earnings estimates, not final figures restated years later. Choosing 
a fixed date on which to determine the Trill’s coupon, say three months after fiscal 
yearend, and using the real-time GDP estimate available at that time, would enhance 
investors’ understanding of the income stream provided by a Trill. 
Maintaining Efficient Financial Markets for Currently Available Debt Instruments 
The impact of Trills on financial markets is an important consideration from the 
perspective of the U.S. government. How would room be made for Trills without 
compromising traditional debt markets? It may be difficult to substitute Trills for 
conventional debt as it comes due. Capital markets rely on the term structure of U.S. 
government nominal debt as a reference point for pricing other fixed-coupon nominal debt, 
and as a hedging instrument. This debt is also used to park wealth by foreigners seeking a 
safe haven from political and economic instability.  
The current financing needs of the U.S. government   may make it easy to find 
room for a new debt instrument.  It is also possible to make room for Trills in the regular 
issuance of government securities by using the proceeds from the sale of Trills to fund 
                                                 
5 We are grateful to Nicholas Le Pan for his insights on the process leading up to the adoption of real return 
bonds (RRBs) in Canada. 
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federal government obligations that are currently unfunded, thus ensuring that the net 
indebtedness of the government does not increase.  
Potential Uses for Proceeds from Sale of Trills 
The most obvious use of the proceeds of Trills in the nearer term would be to fund 
federal government obligations that are currently unfunded. A precedent for this change 
would be the Canadian government’s 2000 move to fund future employee pensions: rather 
than adding a book-keeping entry to its unfunded pension liabilities every year as 
previously, the Canadian government now issues additional funded government debt and is 
building a pension fund administered by an arm’s-length board to invest in order to pay 
future pension benefits. The U.S. government has many unfunded obligations on its books 
– for example, the fair value of social security benefits. Establishing investment funds to 
cover these and other liabilities is arguably desirable in its own right, and would permit the 
federal government to issue large amounts of Trills without affecting its net indebtedness 
or reducing outstanding securities of other kinds. 
Another potential use of the proceeds from the sale of Trills would be an 
investment fund similar to those established to manage budget surpluses in many countries 
around the world, such as Norway's Government Pension Fund, and Canada’s Alberta 
Heritage Fund. The government would want to invest the proceeds from the sale of Trills 
to earn sufficient returns to cover their coupon payments. To the extent there are surpluses 
and shortfalls in the income flows from such a fund, these could be used to stabilize 
government revenues. In this way, government cash flows would be less vulnerable to 
macroeconomic surprises. Such a fund would face governance challenges. We recommend 
that the proceeds from issuing Trills, pooled in a sovereign wealth fund similar to 
Norway’s,  should be managed at arms length from the government, with a clear mandate 
to promote diversification and long-run stable returns. 
Should the U.S. government decide to issue Trills, we expect other countries to 
follow suit over time, just as Finland’s introduction of indexed bonds in 1946 led to many 
others following suit. The availability of Trills issued by countries around the world would 
present an opportunity for nations to buy each other’s Trills, using the proceeds from the 
sale of their own Trills. This would result in the pooling of income across nations and the 
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reduction of the volatility of those nations’ income streams, because different nations’ 
business cycles are less than perfectly correlated.6 This is an attractive prospect: if 
developing countries were to issue Trills and purchase developed countries’ Trills, the 
booms and busts the developing countries experience would have a muted impact on their 
ability to provide basic services and to manage their own debt obligations. Emerging 
market economies have perhaps the most to gain from the introduction of Trills, but the 
prospect of a developed economy sharing in the growth of these emerging economies 
should be reward enough for providing this free-market-priced insurance policy.  
Who Would Buy Trills? 
While we expect pension funds and individual Americans would line up to 
purchase Trills, they may not be the only interested parties. Foreigners would also be 
potential purchasers. As noted in the previous section, purchases of other countries’ Trills 
would offer a new and valuable kind of international diversification. 
Should we be concerned with foreigners owning this sort of claim on America’s 
income? We do not think so. First of all, foreigners are already allowed to own Treasury 
debt, so Trills set no precedent. Furthermore, if Trill-equivalents from other countries 
become available to Americans, the resulting exchange of claims would be of great value 
to American pension fund managers (and fund managers from around the world) because 
of the benefits of diversification. Business cycles of nations, while correlated, do not move 
one-for-one, and the availability of assets that perfectly track GDP cycles of nations from 
around the world would provide a new asset class for diversification, an important 
contribution of Trills. 
Trills even offer the potential to stabilize world economies by increasing 
international interconnectivity and reducing the incentive of governments to engage in 
mutually destructive trade wars. 
Similar Securities from Around the World 
The first proposal we know of for a true GDP-linked bond came from Shiller in 
1993. In Macro Markets: Creating Institutions for Managing Society’s Largest Economic 
                                                 
6 See, for instance, Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1995) and Baxter (1995). 
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Risks he draws comparisons between a firm’s earnings and a country's GDP, and describes 
the same GDP-linked security that we propose here. This study is itself based very closely 
on Kamstra and Shiller (2008).  
Borensztein and Mauro (2004) sought to revive the case for GDP growth-linked 
bonds, Kruse, Meitner and Schroder (2005) detail how to price bonds with coupons tied to 
the growth of the GDP, and Griffith-Jones and Sharma (2006) outline the benefits of 
introducing GDP-linked bonds and document various countries’ efforts to establish such 
instruments. Spilinbergo et al. (2008) argue that, to reduce the vulnerability of the 
economy to systemic financial crises, governments might sell recession insurance to firms 
and individuals, arguing that such insurance would help reduce the effect of lost 
confidence on reduced investment and consumption. Of course, if the government issues 
Trills it would have a similar impact, since individuals’ tax liabilities to support payment 
of the government debt would be reduced in bad times.   
To the best of our knowledge, true GDP shares have not yet been issued by any 
country. In the mid-1990s, bonds with attached GDP warrants were issued by Bulgaria, 
Bosnia and Costa Rica in concert with their Brady Plan restructurings. These bonds 
included clauses to increase coupon payments at predetermined GDP thresholds rather than 
in lockstep with the GDP.  
In 2001, Singapore issued the New Singapore Shares, which pay a 3 percent return 
plus the economic growth rate of Singapore, if positive, rather than a coupon tied to the 
GDP level. Argentina’s 2005 GDP warrants are a fairly complicated financial instrument. 
Payments are linked to the growth of the economy, rather than the level of the GDP and are 
conditional on three criteria being met simultaneously. First, real GDP must be at a higher 
level than a predetermined baseline GDP. Second, real growth of GDP must be greater 
than a baseline growth. Finally, there is a total payment cap.  
In contrast, the Trill would be as simple and familiar as shares in corporations. We 
believe that transparency and simple structure are essential to establishing demand for 
these securities and ensuring that their market is liquid. Tying the Trill’s payment to the 
level of the GDP would accomplish these goals. 
While a few countries have experimented with GDP bond-like instruments, a 
sensible question to ask is why there has been no attempt to issue a true GDP bond. There 
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are several possible reasons for the limited interest to date. First, it is plausible that 
government Treasury officials do not perceive any need to issue such a security. The 
primary obligation of any country’s Treasury (as it is commonly perceived) is to enable 
low-cost financing for government’s operational needs. Treasuries are not generally 
perceived as having a risk-management role. Investors will typically be willing to pay a 
higher price for fixed-coupon debt than for GDP bonds whose coupons would fluctuate 
with the economy’s performance. Hence, fixed-coupon debt and, especially, real-return 
debt will normally be relatively cheaper for the government to issue.  Our own analysis 
indicates the cost of issuance of the Trill will be in the order of 150 basis points above 
short term government debt.  
Another reason for Treasury’s limited interest in issuing GDP bonds likely arises 
from the secondary objective of the government’s debt policy—to ensure the efficiency of 
the market for government securities. To date, the government has sensibly focused its 
efforts on providing liquidity to the traditional nominal-coupon bond market. Without the 
regular and routine issue of large quantities of new nominal government debt, the market 
for nominal debt instruments cannot function properly. This pressure to promote 
government debt market liquidity has a tendency to mitigate any potential interest in 
exploring new debt instruments. 
There is a possibility that trills could be privately issued. Index-linked bonds, called 
MacroShares, have been issued under the auspices of the US company MacroMarkets LLC 
that could be a model for the private issuance of GDP-linked securities. The securities, 
whose structure is patented in the United States, are issued by a special entity whose 
charter dictates that it does nothing else, and invests their underlying assets according to 
specific rules. The rules state that shares are automatically issued and redeemed upon 
public demand in creation units only in pairs, one long the index, the other short the index, 
and the assets underlying the shares are invested in U.S. Treasury bills, so that the issuer 
cannot fail to index effectively. The long and short securities, when issued, trade separately 
on a stock exchange. MacroShares indexed to the S&P/Case-Shiller 10-City Home Price 
Index, with the ticker symbols UMM and DMM, are now traded on the New York Stock 
Exchange Arca. Such a structure could be applied to the issuance of trills in the United 
States, by substituting U.S. GDP for real estate price in the structure. These could even be 
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perpetual trills, since the structure is not dependent on the activities and survival of any 
financial entity that does other business. The structure creates a market for both long and 
short interests in GDP, and the hope in establishing such a private market for GDP in the 
U.S. would be that a sufficient number of investors would want to take a short position in 
U.S. GDP. Such investors might include state governments of the U.S, who could use them 
to hedge their own tax and expenditure risks, or corporations whose revenues rise and fall 
with GDP  
But, trills, by their very nature, are most naturally issued by a national government. 
A national government can most effectively hedge the claims provided by a GDP bond 
with both the right to tax income and the ability to invest proceeds from issuing the GDP 
bond in other nations’ similar securities. 
Notwithstanding their novelty and these reservations, however, we feel that Trills 
would be a useful addition to the range of available government securities in the U.S. 
Pension funds are larger than ever, and the good fit between this type of asset and their 
liabilities suggests to us that there would be a lively appetite for Trills, and that they would 
be issueable at reasonable cost to the government. Importantly, moreover, we see think that 
by funding currently unfunded liabilities, the federal government could issue Trills without 
either increasing its net indebtedness or hurting the liquidity and completeness of the 
markets for other government securities. 
Conclusions 
A Trill is essentially an equity stake in the economy. When publicly traded 
companies issue equity rather than debt, they typically do so because debt markets are not 
available to them or the addition of more debt to their capital structure would unacceptably 
increase their risk of bankruptcy. Given a choice, incumbent equity holders would rather 
not have to share with others the upside of the growth potential of a company. For the 
introduction of Trills to make sense for, it must be the case that the availability of an equity 
stake in the U.S.solves some problem that issuing debt cannot solve.  
We believe this new debt instrument would be of interest for its stabilizing 
influence on the budget (as the Trill’s coupon payments would fall with declining budget 
revenues), in contrast to the menu of fixed coupon debt instruments currently available. 
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Our valuation of the Trill indicates its yield would be very attractive to the issuer, the U.S. 
government, and Trills would, at the very least, provide a convenient tool to fund federal 
government obligations that are currently unfunded, making government finances more 
transparent. 
We have made a case that Trills would also help pension plans diversify into 
inflation-protected assets tied to the wealth of the nation and would allow individuals 
planning for retirement to enjoy the benefits of real economic growth in the U.S. In the 
language of financial economists, the current menu of available assets is incomplete. There 
are risks in the economy, related specifically to human capital and the GDP that cannot be 
traded in existing financial markets. (The risks associated with companies’ fortunes, in 
contrast, can be traded in existing equity and corporate bond markets.) For investors 
seeking a return tied to U.S. labor productivity and the overall growth in the economy, 
there is simply no substitute for the Trill. Introducing Trills would help complete financial 
markets, which would lead to better diversification and hedging possibilities for everyone. 
Standard financial analysis suggests that Trills would provide the issuer, the U.S. 
government , with a budget-stabilizing, moderate cost debt instrument, and  investors with 
an asset that cannot be replicated with existing assets, allowing investors new portfolio 
diversification strategies that preserve high returns and lower volatility. Indeed the current 
financial crisis can be, at least in part, tied back to a shortage of counterparty-risk-free 
assets and fund manager’s thirst for high yield investments. The existence of a large float 
of Trills issued by the U.S. government could help ensure that this coincidence of factors is 
unlikely to ever appear again. The issuer and the investors in Trills would both stand to 
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A p p e n d i x :  V a l u a t i o n  o f  t h e  T r i l l  
 
Since the Trill is a security that is not now available, its price and return can be 
only estimated. We present two valuation exercises here, one being the projected valuation 
of a Trill, the other being the valuation of the market, proxied using the S&P 500 index. 
Analysis of a priced asset facilitates a comparison between the observed value and the 
estimated value. Presumably, if the valuation technique works well for pricing the S&P 
500 index, we can lean on it to price the Trill.  
A large variety of methods have been proposed for the valuation of equity, and 
these are applicable as well to Trills. The best-known methods are based on the Gordon 
Growth Model of constant dividend growth and constant discount rates.  The Gordon 
Model, which discounts expected future cash flows, defines the price of an asset as equal 
to the next period’s cash flow divided by the discount rate minus the growth rate of cash 
flows. For example, if the next period cash flow is expected to be $1, and the discount rate 
is 10 percent and the growth rate of cash flows 5 percent, then the Gordon Model would 
indicate a price of $20. (P=$1/(0.1-0.05)). 
While the notion of constant discount rates and dividend growth rates is simple to 
work with, more realistic models of dividends and discount rates have been developed, 
including models that embed a fixed probability of maintaining the dividend payment at 
current levels and a probability of raising it.  
One early model, based on methods developed by Campbell and Shiller (1988), 
was used by Shiller (1993), but that method as applied to GDP took no account of 
changing discount rates.  
The Additive Markov Gordon model (see Equation 1 of Yao 1997) and the 
Geometric Markov Gordon model (see Equation 2 of Yao 1997) are more recent examples 
of equity valuation models. They still impose constant discount rates, meaning that 
investor risk aversion and market interest rates are constant, which seems improbable.  
Another extension of the Gordon Model developed by Donaldson and Kamstra 
(1996), permits predictably changing and autocorrelated dividend growth and discount 
rates. This autocorrelation can be understood as a fade rate; that is, the speed at which a 
rate converges to its long-run stable rate. The more autocorrelation, the slower the fade and 
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the higher the value of the asset experiencing a (temporarily) higher-than-average growth 
in cash flows. We have not fully resolved our differences on the extent to which the 
volatility of markets can be explained in terms of a rational model, but agree that it is 
useful to consider such models. 
To appreciate the importance of fade rates in valuation, take the example of a firm 
with two equally likely scenarios for cash-flow growth rates. Under one scenario, the rate 
decreases from its past average of 10 percent to 7 percent. Under the other, the average rate 
increases to 13 percent. Once changed, the average rate remains constant.  
Before the change in growth rates, the expectation is for an average growth of 10 
percent, as it has been before any change. If the discount rate is expected to be 15 percent 
and the most recent dividend was one dollar, then the classic Gordon Growth Model would 
yield a price of $1/(0.15-0.10) or $20 per share.  
However, if we recognize that cash-flow growth rate changes are permanent (an 
extreme form of autocorrelation, with no fade back to the average), then the Gordon prices 
should be calculated for each scenario separately and the two prices are averaged to get a 
price that accounts for this autocorrelation. The low cash-flow growth rate case yields a 
price of $1/(0.15-0.07) or $12.50 per share, and the high-rate case yields a price of 
$1/(0.15-0.13) or $50.00 per share, for an average price of $31.25. Accounting for the fade 
rate dramatically changes the price estimate, increasing it by more than 50 percent.  
Very similar numbers result if we use discount-rate changes instead of cash-flow 
growth rate changes. Even more dramatic examples can be constructed if both discount 
rates and cash-flow growth rates move in opposite directions. While it is straightforward to 
adjust the Gordon Model for a simple scenario like this, the Donaldson and Kamstra 
(1996) technique permits extremely complex scenario analysis that is otherwise infeasible, 
scenarios in which the cash-flow growth rate and/or the discount rate never settle down, 
and possibly influence each other as well. For more detailed descriptions of all these 
techniques, see Kamstra (2003). 
Regardless, for all of these valuation techniques we need to establish the growth 
rate of cash flows, the cash flows themselves and the discount rate. Discount rates are often 
formed as the sum of a short-term, risk-free rate and a risk premium, the approach adopted 
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here. The equity or risk premium is the premium investors demand before the fact, when 
the decision to invest in risky assets like equities instead of risk-free debt is first made.  
A downward-trending equity premium also needs to be incorporated, motivated by 
recent work of Pástor and Stambaugh (2001).  This work suggests a total drop of 80 basis 
points over the period considered, the last half-century, including a sudden drop of 50 basis 
points in the early 1990s. It is too soon to tell whether the financial crisis that began in 
2007 with the subprime crisis represents a break in this trend. The literature on the equity 
premium is large, continuously growing and much too vast to fully cite here. For recent 
work, see Bansal and Yaron (2004), Graham and Harvey (2005) and Jain (2005). For 
excellent surveys see Kocherlakota (1996), Siegel and Thaler (1997), Mehra and Prescott 
(2003) and Mehra (2003).  
The average dividend yield on the S&P 500 index over roughly the last half-
century has been slightly more than 3 percent, though it has trended down remarkably, 
recently, before the subprime crisis,  hovering around 2 percent. Cash-flow growth has 
averaged about 6 percent and has been quite variable, with dividends falling as much as 3 
percent in some years and growing in excess of 15 percent in others.  
Growth in dividends shows little persistence or predictability, in contrast to one-
year, T-bill rates, which are highly persistent (i.e., exhibiting a very low fade rate). T-bill 
rates have averaged just less than 6 percent over the last half-century, from as low as 
almost 1 percent to more than 14 percent. Even incorporating very low-risk premia, simple 
Gordon Growth Models imply much lower prices for the S&P 500 index, and much higher 
yields than are seen in the market, so we do not employ these techniques for the pricing of 
Trills.  
Using a risk premium that averages 3.5 percent, starting at 4 percent in the early 
1960s and declining to roughly 3 percent by 2007 (as implied by Donaldson, Kamstra, and 
Kramer, 2007 and Graham and Harvey, 2005), incorporating a slow fade rate for discount 
rates and a very rapid fade for cash-flow growth rates, and using the technique of 
Donaldson and Kamstra (1996), we find much more reasonable prices and yields than can 
be produced by the Gordon Growth models. Indeed, these results closely match the actual 
market prices and yields.  (See Figure 1, Panels A and B in the main text.) 
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Had the U.S. government  issued Trills for the last half-century, the growth rate of 
the cash flow from this asset would have averaged roughly 7 percent (nominal) annually, 
from as low as approximately 1 percent to as high as approximately 13 percent. This 
annual growth rate is about half as volatile as the S&P 500 index cash-flow growth rates 
over the same period. As well, the growth rate of this cash flow would be strongly 
autocorrelated, in contrast to the cash-flow growth rates of the S&P 500 index. Again, 
using an average risk premium of 3.5 percent, incorporating a slow fade rate for discount 
rates, a slow fade rate for cash-flow growth rates and the technique of Donaldson and 
Kamstra (1996), we find a price appreciation of Trills from the 1960s that is very similar to 
that of the S&P 500 index. This growth is driven largely by two factors: the relatively high 
growth rate in cash flows (GDP) and the strong persistence in these growth rates. (See 
Figure 1, Panels C and D in the main text.) 
A separate but closely related question is whether investors would hold a 
substantial portion of their portfolio in Trills, if Trills were available. In order to answer 
this question, we must compare the risk, return and covariance of the return from holding 
Trills with other risky assets. Consider a three-risky-asset world (the S&P 500 index, long-
term government bonds and Trills), plus a risk-free asset (a one t-bill). Over the past half-
century, the returns to these assets (returns to the Trill are calculated assuming a 3.5 
percent risk premium and hence mechanically about 3.5 percent above the risk free return) 
are 12 percent, 7.3 percent, 10.7 percent and 6 percent for the risk-free asset. The 
volatilities of these assets are 15 percent, 12 percent, 7 percent and zero, respectively. The 
covariances of these assets indicate small positive correlation between the S&P 500 index 
and the Trill, small negative correlation between long-term bonds and the S&P 500 index 
and somewhat stronger negative correlation between the Trill and long-term bonds. 
Standard mean-variance (imposing a 1.5% risk premium for Trills, suggested by the 
CAPM) produces an optimal portfolio composition of 28 percent of assets in long-term 
bonds, 38 percent in the S&P 500 index and 34 percent in Trills.  
These estimates were made using a sample period that ends in 2007, before the 
dramatic fall in stock prices with the subprime crisis. Future research, incorporating more 
stock market data, may lead to changes in this optimal portfolio composition. If, as might 
turn out to be the case, the new regime shows higher stock market volatility and lower 
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stock market average returns, the implied portfolio weights to Trills might be even higher. 
Perhaps some investor demand for Trills will be based on such an assumption, whether it is 
right or not. But to study the possibility of such a regime change, we can only wait and see 
as more data become available.  
 
